

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

PROS AND CONS OF BLOCKADE ON POL SHIPMENTS

1. From import data it is estimated roughly that Cuba in 1962 is using 90,000 B/d of POL. Essentially all of it is imported, about 50% in non-bloc tankers. The data on use patterns are not very good but perhaps 25% for public utilities 40% is for transportation, 25% for industry, 6% for household and 3% for agriculture.
2. It is guessed that about 75 days supply at this rate of consumption is on hand. Stocks of gasoline are probably significantly smaller than fuel oils.
3. It would be possible by strict rationing to get along for 3-6 months, depending largely on the use. But this assumes rather good management, for which the Cubans have not been notable recently.
4. The cutbacks in consumer goods and services, the disorganization resulting from attempts at tight rationing and the easily foreseeable end of the road would all be bound to have effects on the political position of the present regime, especially if it is under strains from other causes.

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

87 - DOS 2127 - - PB.1

5. Pro inclusion

- a. It would be the only direct pressure on the Castro regime as punishment for letting in the offensive weapons.
- b. It would point clearly to the time when that regime could no longer survive.
- c. It would stimulate political unrest thus perhaps advancing still further the date when Castro threat to Hemisphere, military and subversive, would cease.
- d. It would be easiest way to get tougher as no stoppage to inspect would be necessary -- tankers are easily recognizable.
- e. The turning back would be applied about evenly to Soviet bloc and nonbloc ships thus giving Soviets less basis for complaint they are being singled out for especially rough treatment.

6. Cons

- a. It is addressed to the continuation of the regime and not just to the offensive weapons capability which we have said was the main cause for action.
- b. It would put pressure fairly directly on the

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

-3-

Cuban people, making their lives more difficult.

- c. It would be in all above respects more serious move, perhaps forcing more significant response from Soviets before there has been chance for

- - - any dialogue.

- d. It would deprive us of one of simplest and most useful desires for escalating our pressure, of a sort that it might be useful to be able to bring into play in the course of the dialogue or exchange of actions.

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE